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IN THE SUPREME COUR'T 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JACK \Y. :McCOLLUM, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. No. 7721 
J. V. CLOTHIER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since the judgment subsequently was entered in 
favor of the plaintiff, we accordingly restate the facts 
in most particulars in accordance with the evidence most 
favorable to the plaintiff, as it was the prerogative of 
the court subsequently to believe such evidence rather 
than possibly conflicting evidence offered by the defend-
ant. 
Mr. Iverson, one of defendant's attorneys, and his 
attorney of recordin the matter of the foreclosure of his 
mortgage on the Kiest property, obtained plaintiff's 
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name and telephone number from Margaret Stewart 
(Tr. 60 and 61), the Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Kiest 
property after it went into bankruptcy in the middle 
part of 1949, and who had disclaimed any interest in 
said mortgaged property, for the purpose of having 
the plaintiff acquaint him with the various items of 
machinery covered by the mortgage. Previously, the 
plaintiff had been employed by the Kiest people and 
had also ren<iered services for Miss Stewart as a sales-
man for some of the Kiest machinery not covered by 
the mortgaga and as a watchman on the premises. At 
Mr. Iverson'$ request (Tr. 6), the plaintiff met him 
at the plant. This, of course, was after he had been 
relieved of his duties for Miss Stewart, whom he had 
labored for in an excellent manner (Tr. 60). Present 
at this meeting also were Miss Henrietta McGlone, de-
fendant's other counsel, and J. D. Hooper, who was 
employed as a wafuhman. The 1nachinery was checked 
off and identified and then the matter of how the ma-
chinery was to be disposed of was discussed and just 
before they left, Mr. Iverson told the plaintiff to line 
up buyers for the machinery (Tr. 7). Plaintiff asked 
Iverson how soon the sale of the machinery was to come 
about, and he was told two weeks. Upon asking if he 
could be sure he was then informed "better make it a 
month". This request was made outside the plant when 
they were ready to leave (Tr. 35). There was some talk 
when they were in the plant and Mr. Iverson there had 
asked plaintiff to "keep track" of the buyers that were 
interested. The plaintiff, through his efforts in Miss 
Stewart's behalf had tnade contact with a number of 
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persons interested in purchasing certain of these ite1ns 
of 1nachinery, and it was in lining up and keeping track 
of these purchasers and contacts n1ade through these 
purchasers that the plaintiff, at the request of the de-
fendant's agent and with the knowledge of both defend-
ant and his agent, rendered beneficial services which 
the defendant availed himself of. Never at any time 
during these conversations was a sheriff's or judicial 
sale talked about, and plaintiff knew at the time what 
a judicial or sheriff's sale was (Tr. 7 and 36). 
The list of the machinery showing the prices at 
which the items were to sell was given plaintiff previ-
ously by :\Ir. Iverson at his office in Salt Lake City (Tr. 
9 and 10), and plaintiff was told on that occasion to call 
back in half an hour, as to what for apparently he was 
not told, but ·when he returned Mr. Iverson had gone so 
the plaintiff had to make another trip to Salt Lake to 
see him (Tr. 10). 
Plaintiff then proceeded to contact firms in Salt 
Lake, Ogden, Pocatello, Boise, Weiser, Paul, Rupert 
and Burley, Idaho, and Vale, Oregon, and also made a 
trip to Los Angeles to contact the manufacturer of the 
machinery. The contacts at Boise, Weiser and Vale 
were all on the same trip. He made no less than nine 
trips to Salt Lake and went to Mr. Iverson's office every 
time and was able to see and talk to him the greater 
number of these trips about prospective purchasers and 
prices (Tr. 11, 36 and 37). He made three trips to Poca-
tello Idaho on one of which he visited the defendant 
' ' and Miss McGlone for the purpose of discussing the 
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price of the building and talking about the machinery, 
and on the other two he contacted fabricating steel 
plants on the outskirts of town who were interested 
in some of the machinery ( Tr. 13, 14 and 50). Everyone 
whom plaintiff contacted was interested in one or more 
of the various items and they all came to see them (Tr. 
11), calling upon the plaintiff when they would come 
and he would t~ke them out to the plant to view the 
machinery. They were all prepared to pay more than 
the price listed on the price list (Tr. 11-19). Some 
of the intended purchasers demanded that plaintiff 
take down payments on the merchandise, so plaintiff 
sought Mr. Iverson's advice and was directed not to 
take any money (Tr. 20). This he did, however, and 
deposited it in a special account. Later when the date 
of the sale dragged on, certain of them became disinter-
ested and plaintiff gave their money back as he did ulti-
mately to all of them (Tr. 20). 
Plaintiff had a conversation with Dr. Clothier in 
Pocatello sometime in June or July, as he recalls, con-
cerning the land and buildings and also the machinery. 
His main purpose in going to Pocatello at that par .. 
ticular time was because he had a purchaser lined up 
who was interested in the land, but he also told the 
doctor how he was coming in disposing of the ma-
chinery. The following conversation took place at that 
meeting, and this is uncontradicted in the record (Tr. 
21 and 22): 
"A. Well, my big purpose in going to see 
him was to find out what he wanted for the build-
ing and the land then of course I told him how 
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I was doing in disposing of the machinery or 
having prospective buyers, but I was able to get 
from him the approximate amount he was going 
to ask for the building and the land, and he told 
me he said, "son1ewhere around five thousand dol-
lars, maybe a little more," and that was rnainly 
the information I went after . 
.. Q. You testified previously you had ob-
tained, or that you had contacted persons who 
were interested in the land? 
··A. Yes. 
"Q. Specifically the Olson Manufacturing 
Company? 
''A. Yes. 
"Q. Did you mention that fact to Doctor 
Clothier? 
"A. Well, when the president of the Olson 
:Manufacturing Company came down here, he 
asked me to line up the buyers for him. He want~ 
ed to be kept anonymous. When I was talking 
to Doctor Clothier, why he was very much inter-
ested in who this buyer would be and I didn't 
want to tell him, but he kept, well he kept asking 
so I said, "well, it's a subsidiary of Morrison-
Knudsen," but he promised he wouldn't say a 
word to anybody about it, and then he still had 
set the price close to five thousand dollars. I 
guess I no sooner left his office than he rnust 
have dropped a letter off to Morrison-Knudsen 
and asked if they were the parties interested in 
the property. They wrote back and said "no," 
which was right. They weren't. The persons that 
were interested, I never did let their names get 
out until after the sale." 
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Before the sale, plaintiff mentioned to Mr. Iverson 
that he had obtained better prices for the n1achinery 
than those listed on the list he was furnished (Tr. 22). 
Particularly he remembers a shear that was outside the 
building which had some pieces stolen from it and he 
several times asked Mr. Iverson what the new price 
on it was to be in its stripped down condition; how-
ever, he was never told and the new price was not put on· 
it until the day of the sale (Tr. 22 and 23). 
There were persons present at the sale whom the 
plaintiff had contacted and he heard them bid and have 
items struck off to them at lower prices than they were 
prepared to pay for them according to his contacts 
(Tr. 23 and 24). 
The plaintiff is a qualified expert in dealing and 
selling the type of machinery in question, having started 
working in machinery in 1946 and having sold machinery 
for ICiest. He understood any and all types of ma-
chinery necessary for the fabrication of steel. He knew 
what machinery salesmen drew as salary, and that they 
drew not less than $350.00 a month in commissions and 
expenses, and what they drew as mileage allowances. 
The value of his services for the defendant he figured 
to be $500.00 a month, and mileage at the rate of six 
cents a mile. He stated that he would settle for two 
months' compensation even though his services extended 
beyond that (Tr. 24, 25 and 26). 
On the day of the sale, August 2, 1950, the plaintiff 
asked about pay for his services, and Iverson said he 
would talk to the doctor, but plaintiff never did heat 
from either of them after that (Tr. 27 and 28). 
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Plaintiff talked with Henrietta :McGlone, the doc-
tor's other counsel, in Pocatello, Idaho in the hospital, 
on the sru:ne day he spoke with the doctor. Their conver-
sation dwelt with the n1achinery, the land and the build-
ings and what the doctor was asking for them. He also 
made inquiry for ~lr. Simpson, the caretaker, as to his 
wages (Tr. 29). He stated that he had authority to ask 
about Simpson's pay (Tr. 37). 
~-\.t the close of the evidence and after considerable 
argun1ent and comn1ent by the court and counsel, it ruled 
that plaintiff had failed to make out a cause of action 
and held for the defendant. Between this time and the 
time that defendant's proposed findings and judgment 
were submitted, the court apparently changed its mind 
and felt that the defendant andjor his agent, ~Ir. Iver-
son, had used the plaintiff and that he was entitled to 
some compensation, and that $250.00 would be about 
right. Accordingly, he directed counsel for plaintiff to 
draw findings and judgment based thereon to which 
defendant filed objections which were heard by the court 
on April 16, 1951. At the hearing on plaintiff's first 
proposed findings and judgment, counsel for defendant 
and the court differed in their recollections as to the 
evidence, and the court ordered a transcript of plain-
tiff's testimony prepared and the matter to be heard at 
a later date. After reading the testimony the court 
apparently changed its mind again and decided that the 
plaintiff was entitled to more than he had first given 
and ordered counsel for plaintiff to prepare the findings 
and judgment appealed from, to which the defendant 
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also filed objections. Counsel for plaintiff was duly 
notified by the clerk of the court that the hearing on 
these objections was set for June 4, 1951, and upon this 
day counsel attended court prepared to argue same, 
and sat through the entire law and motion calendar 
waiting for defendant's counsel to arrive. The clerk 
informed the court that counsel had been noticed, but 
he nevertheless failed to appear, and at the end of the 
calendar the findings and judgment appealed from were 
signed in open court. 
While plaintiff's evidence attempted ·to embrace 
services and mileage to Los Angeles, California, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, Pocatello, Idaho, Vale, Oregon, and 
Boise, Rupert, Paul, Burley and Weiser, Idaho, we call 
attention to the fact that plaintiff recovered only for 
four trips to Salt Lake from Ogden and return, and 
two trips to Pocatello, Idaho and return plus service~ 
in the sum of $600.00 which the court subsequently felt 
should compensate the plaintiff for the time and effort 
expended in the defendant's behalf, and which would be 
roughly equivalent to two months' wages. This award 
is what is before the court now. 
PmT I. 
1
.fHI FINDINGS OF f4'10T AND JU1)(I(Ilft' ENTERED 'ftiBRiON .lRi 
SUPPCJB.T.ID BY THE ltVID.ENCE AID .ARE lOT COITRARI THDITO• 
It should be pointed out that appellant's repeated 
use of the opinions expressed by the court during the 
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trial of the eanse, whirh adn1ittedly favor hiin, at thi~ 
stage of the proceeding are not material and serve to 
show nothing 1nore than what the court's thoughts were 
at the moment during the trial. Further, there is no 
judgment unless and until signed by the Judge and he 
has the prerogative of changing his n1ind if subsequently 
the evidence should strike hin1 the other way. Rule 58 
~-\. (b) rtah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as fol-
lows: 
"(b) Judgment in Other Cases. Except as 
provided in subdivision (a) hereof and subdivi-
sion (b) (1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall bP 
signed by the judge and filed with the clerk." 
And (c) provides : 
·· (c) \Yhen Judgment Entered; Notation in 
Register of Actions and Judgment Docket. A 
judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered 
for all purposes, except the creation of a lien 
on real property, when the same is signed and 
filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall 
immediately make a notation of the judgment in 
the register of actions and the judgment docket." 
Appellant's remarks as to plaintiff's trips to Vale, 
Oregon and every other place indicated also do not 
seem material for the reason that plaintiff recovered 
only for two trips to Pocatello, Idaho and four trips 
to Salt Lake City. 
We call attention to the fact that J. D. Hooper, a. 
witness for the plaintiff, stated that what he testified 
to was all that was said in his presence, "something to 
that effect," (Tr. 65), which, of course, was all that he 
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was called upon for, but this does not preclude other 
conTPrsation concerning the matter to have taken place 
away frorn his presence and hearing, which, of course, 
plaintiff has testified to (Tr. 35). 
:Miss McGlone testified that nothing was said con-
cerning any employment at that time, but it must be 
remembered that we here seek to recover not on the 
basis of a specific and express contract, but on one im-
plied from the request of Mr. Iverson and the subse-
quent knowledge and encouragement from both the doc-
tor and Mr. Iverson, and, of course, on the basis that 
the doctor availed himself of the benefits of plaintiff's 
labors in his behalf. Plaintiff has so testified and the 
trial court subsequently believed him (Tr. 21, 22 and 
36). 
Appellant's statement that plaintiff quit without 
notice seems unsupported and, in fact, was denied by 
the plaintiff (Tr. 47, 48 and 55). 
While the court in the April 16th hearing on objec-
tions to the first set of plaintiff's findings might have 
been mistaken in its recollection of the evidence as to 
plaintiff having a key to the premises, the evidence is 
uncontroverted to the effect that plaintiff had access 
to the plant through the caretaker and made trips there 
during the course of the summer to show prospective 
purchasers the machinery (Tr. 11, 26, 46, 47 and 48). 
This evidence stands uncontradicted in the record. The 
court in this same hearing might have been mistaken 
also as to its recollection of Dr. Clothier's exact remarks 
10 
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with re~peet to his knowledge of plaintiff's activities, 
but it wa~ not Inistaken in its thought that Dr. Clothier 
had knowledge that the plaintiff was perfonning serv-
ices in his behalf with respect to the machinery and the 
land abo. although nothing is claimed as to the land. 
This evidence is uncontroverted in the record also (Tr. 
:21 and :2~). 
It is interesting to note that on cross-examination, 
:Mr. Iverson was not too clear in calling to mind the 
eyents that transpired. I invite the court's attention to 
pages 70, 71, 72 and 85 of the transcript. With respect 
to the price list talked about he testified as follows on 
cross-examination (Tr. 85-86): 
"Q. And you say you didn't give him this 
list at your office 1 
"A. As I remember, I gave him that list 
the day we were at the plant. I had two or three 
copies of the list and we were using one list to 
check off the items as we checked from iten1 to 
item to see whether or not he was turning over 
everything that belonged to us. I had two or three 
copies of it. I think I gave him one that day. 
He asked what the stuff was worth. 
"Q. Are you willing to say now categorically 
whether you did or didn't 1 
"A. No, I couldn't say that categorically." 
Attention is also called to Mr. Iverson's testimony 
on direct examination wherein he related the conversa-
tion with the plaintiff at the plant specifically with re-
spect to the sale (Tr. 68). 
11 
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"* * * and I told him that when a sale came 
we would very much appreciate having all the 
buyers that we could get, and I would appreciate 
it if he would keep track of those buyers, and he 
asked what prices would be charged, and I said, 
'well, it will be a sale, but I can give you what 
it's appraised for.' " 
Now here is there mentioned anything about a judi-
cial. sale. Mr. Iverson also admitted on pre-trial that 
there was no doubt but what a number of people may 
have attended the sale through plaintiff's efforts. This 
was the recollection of the court (Tr. 79). 
The general rule as to recovery on quantum meruit 
under common counts of assumpsit is set out in 58 Am. 
J ur. 512. It is there said in Section 3 dealing with the 
subject generally: 
"A promise to pay the reasonable value of 
services performed by one person for another 
although there is no express agreement as to the 
compensation thereby implied where the circum-
stances warrant an inference of a promise to pay 
for such services if where the conduct of the per-
son for whom the work was done is such to justify 
an understanding by the person performing work 
that the former intended to pay for it." Citations. 
Section 6 deals with acceptance of services; receipt 
of benefit. It is there said: 
"In the absence of anything to indicate a 
contrary intention of the parties, where one per-
forms for another a useful service of a character 
that is usually charged for, and such service is 
rendered with knowledge and approval of the 
recipient who either expresses no dissent or avails 
12 
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hhn.self of the services rendered, the law raises 
an 1mplied promise on the part of the recipient 
to pay the reasonable value of such services." 
Citations including a pronouncement by the Su-
preme Court of Utah to this effect in the case 
of Gleason v. Salt Lake City, 94 Utah 1, 74 P. (2) 
1225. 
It is true that in the instant case nothing was said 
concerning compensation, but I submit that this relates 
only to what the amount of compensation was to be, not 
to whether or not compensation was to be paid. Atten-
tion is invited to the case of Williams v. Jones, 182 P. 
391, where the plaintiff was requested by the defendant 
to perfortn certain services. The defendant urged 
strongly that there was no evidence at all to that effect 
and relied on a question and answer in the record on 
examination of the piaintiff to this effect: 
"Was there any agreement between you and 
Mr. Jones as to what you were to charge or not~" 
"No, nothing said about that at all." 
The court, on page 392 said: 
"Obviously, this relates only to what the 
amount of the charge was to be and not to whether 
a charge was to be made." 
I submit that such is the situation in the case at bar. 
In the same case further on, the Court had this to say, 
citing C.J. and R.C.L.: 
"A mere request or direction to the plaintiff 
would be enough to warrant an inference that it 
was to be paid for in the absence that it was to 
be gratuitous or that the plaintiff was to be com-
pensated in some other manner." 
13 
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Attention is also called to the case of City Ice and 
Fuel Company v. Bright, 73 Federal (2) 461, wherein 
the law implied a contract to pay for information from 
circumstances that the parties to whom the information 
was furnished recognized its merit, accepted it and 
made full use of it as a basis for the purchase of a busi-
ness. There was no express agreement to pay the plain-
tiff for the information. It was held that the jury was 
not precluded from considering the value of such infor-
mation under the common counts of assumpsit in the 
plaintiff's action for compensation. 
Mr. Justice Holmes in Spencer v. Spencer, 64 N.E. 
94 7 said this : 
"Again it is not necessary that the defendant 
should have believed that the plaintiff expected 
pay. If, as a reasonable man he should have un-
derstood from what he knew that such was the 
expectation, he would be bound by accepting the 
services." 
In Miller v. Stephens, 195_ N.W. 481, it is said: 
"Where there is no express contract, a con-
tract may be implied; in fact, where one engages 
or accepts beneficial services of another for which 
compensation is customarily made and naturally 
anticipated, and although there be no express 
stipulation between the parties for wages or price, 
the law implies an understanding or intent to pay 
the value of the services rendered." 
In 3 Page on Contracts, Second Ed., Section 1442, 
it is said: 
14 
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'"If services are rendered at the request of 
the person for whom they are rendered, or if 
the benefits are accepted voluntarily by such per-
son, there is an implied promise on his part to 
make reasonable compensation therefor if no 
express contract has been made, if the services 
are such as are ordinarily paid for and if the 
party who rendered them was not bound to ren-
der them without con1pensation." 
We submit that the facts of this case fully permit 
the application of the foregoing rules of law. 
It is further submitted that this being an action at 
law, if there is any substantial evidence to support the 
judgment, this court will not interfere, and likewise will 
not attempt to pass upon what weight should be given 
to particular evidence or statements made 'by witnesses. 
This is the province of the trial court. Harris v. Ogden 
Steam Laundry Co., 39 Utah 436, 117 P. 700. 
POINT II 
~HE COURT DID NOT MISLEAD COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT INTO NOT 
1UTTING IN THE EVIDENCE OF FLOYD SIMPSON FOR THE COURT 
liD NOT INDICATE ITS INTENTION TO ENTER JUDGMENT FOR THE 
IEFENDANT UNTIL BOTH SIDES HAD RESTED• AND· FURTHER, DEFEN-
IANT1 S OWN NEGLECT WAS THE. CAUSE· OF LOSING. SIMPSONi S TES-
'IMONY ASSUMING THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BENEFICIAL. 
At the outset we believe that coun·sel is mistaken 
when he states th~t the court, for some time before 
counsel for defendant indicated he was re·ady to rest 
unless the court desired the evidence of Mr. Simpson, 
had repeatedly stated it to be his opinion that plaintiff 
had no cause of action. The record does not support thi~. 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It shows comment by the court and between counsel and 
the court ( Tr. 78-82) and then a resumption of cross-
examination (Tr. 83) and a bit of redirect and then de-
fendant rested with the remark about Mr. Simpson (Tr. 
89-90). We challenge anyone to glean from these com-
ments and argument (Tr. 78-82) an indicated intention 
on the part of the court to enter a judgment for the 
defendant. The next comment of the court was after 
both sides had rested (Tr. 90). Then the court indicated 
that he had an opinion and Mr. Patterson could not 
change it. 
It occurs to us that perhaps counsel was not par-
ticularly diligent with respect to the witness Simpson. 
If his testimony was so important and the absence of 
it so prejudicial, why did counsel not come armed with 
his deposition. We never did receive notice of the taking 
of his deposition, and we seriously doubt that he would 
have testified as counsel indicates in view of plaintiff's 
testimony relative to Simpson's wages (Tr. 29, 37). 
There is nothing before us to show any diligence 
with respect to obtaining a deposition, or diligence in the 
other matters requisite to obtaining a continuance. The 
witness was never subpoenaed nor was he ever tendered 
any fees, so we fail to see how defendant was prejudiced 
other than by his own conduct. The most that can be 
said in favor of this proffered testimony is that if it 
would have been as defendant indicates then it still 
would not have entitled defendant to a continuance, 
because its value is merely cumulative or impeaching, 
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and it must be shown to be more than that. We invite 
the court's attention to 12 Am. Jur. 474 and 475 in sup-
port of our position in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
It certainly does stretch the imagination to contem-
plate that Mr. McCollum undertook to perform these 
services at the request of 1\Ir. Iverson and with the sub-
sequent assent and encouragement of Dr. Clothier as 
a complete gratuity, and it is completely unreasonable 
to assume that they expected and were led to believe 
that he was doing it for nothing. That they knew he 
was carrying on this work is unquestioned. One cannot 
deny that these services were performed at their request, 
that defendant knowingly enjoyed the benefits of them 
and reasonably should be expected to pay their worth. 
We submit that the court did not err in entering 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE C. PATTERSON, 
RICHARD L. STINE, 
17 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
